Speaker: Professor David Papineau (Professor of Philosophy at King's College London)
Date: Thursday 22 April 2021
Time: 15-17 h (Central European Time, i.e. Amsterdam, Paris, Berlin).
Location: online lecture. Zoom link: https://radbouduniversity.zoom.us/j/88914993855?pwd=elNDemZOY2djODkzOHJkVm4wSTFjZz09
Video of the talk
Perceptual Science and the Philosophy of Perception
Naïve realism about perception has been widely criticized by representationalists for being in tension with cognitive science. The same charge, however, can be brought against the critics. Representationalism as defended within the philosophy of perception is itself inconsistent with the findings of perceptual science. The view that conscious sensory properties are one and the same as representational properties cannot account for the causal roles nor for the specific representational contents that science shows experiences to possess.
David Papineau is one of the most influential philosophers of mind and science. He did a BSc in mathematics at the University of Natal, followed by a BA and PhD in philosophy at Cambridge. After academic posts at the Reading, Macquarie, Birkbeck, and Cambridge, he joined King's College London in 1990. Since 2015 he has spent half each year at the Graduate Center of CUNY in New York. He was President of the Mind Association in 2009 and the Aristotelian Society in 2014. He has written widely on epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of science and mind.
His books include For Science in the Social Sciences (1979), Theory and Meaning (1990), Reality and Representation (1987), Philosophical Naturalism (1992), Thinking about Consciousness (2002), Philosophical Devices (2012), and Knowing the Score (2017).
For more information about The Dutch Distinguished Lecture Series in Philosophy and Neuroscience and the program of talks for this semester, please click here.
Organiser(s): Daniel Kostic, Henk de Regt, Leon de Bruin, Marc Slors, Peter Hagoort
and Gerrit Glas.
Date: Thursday 22 April 2021
Time: 15-17 h (Central European Time, i.e. Amsterdam, Paris, Berlin).
Location: online lecture. Zoom link: https://radbouduniversity.zoom.us/j/88914993855?pwd=elNDemZOY2djODkzOHJkVm4wSTFjZz09
Video of the talk
Perceptual Science and the Philosophy of Perception
Naïve realism about perception has been widely criticized by representationalists for being in tension with cognitive science. The same charge, however, can be brought against the critics. Representationalism as defended within the philosophy of perception is itself inconsistent with the findings of perceptual science. The view that conscious sensory properties are one and the same as representational properties cannot account for the causal roles nor for the specific representational contents that science shows experiences to possess.
David Papineau is one of the most influential philosophers of mind and science. He did a BSc in mathematics at the University of Natal, followed by a BA and PhD in philosophy at Cambridge. After academic posts at the Reading, Macquarie, Birkbeck, and Cambridge, he joined King's College London in 1990. Since 2015 he has spent half each year at the Graduate Center of CUNY in New York. He was President of the Mind Association in 2009 and the Aristotelian Society in 2014. He has written widely on epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of science and mind.
His books include For Science in the Social Sciences (1979), Theory and Meaning (1990), Reality and Representation (1987), Philosophical Naturalism (1992), Thinking about Consciousness (2002), Philosophical Devices (2012), and Knowing the Score (2017).
For more information about The Dutch Distinguished Lecture Series in Philosophy and Neuroscience and the program of talks for this semester, please click here.
Organiser(s): Daniel Kostic, Henk de Regt, Leon de Bruin, Marc Slors, Peter Hagoort
and Gerrit Glas.